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Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die im Bericht  der unabhängigen International  Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty im Dezember 2001 definierten Verantwortung der 
internationalen Staatengemeinschaft, die Bevölkerung eines Staates vor schweren 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu schützen – der sog. Responsibility to Protect – und überprüft die 
vom Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen definierten Kriterien eines Eingreifens anhand des 
gegenwärtigen NATO-Einsatzes  in Libyen. 
 
Dieses Papier wurde bei der Stanford – Vienna Human Rights Conference, die von 20. bis 22. Juni 
2011 unter dem Titel „US-American and European Approaches to Contemporary Human Rights 
Problems“ an der Universität Wien stattgefunden hat, präsentiert.  
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The report of the International Commission 
The “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) is a set of principles that provides the international community 
with a framework for taking action to prevent or stop mass atrocities. These principles were 
developed in response to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report to the 2000 General 
Assembly in which he called on the international community to agree on a basis for collective action 
to intervene against vicious mass crimes, including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and ethnic cleansing.  
In response to Kofi Annan’s challenge, the Government of Canada established the independent 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in September 2000, which issued its 
report, “The Responsibility to Protect,” in December 2001.1  
The report was a response to three recent historical cases: the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the 
massacre of 8,000 Bosnian civilians in Srebrenica in 1995, and the NATO air bombardment of Kosovo 
in 1999. In the first case, the United Nations did not act; in the second, the Dutch UN peacekeeping 
forces had too weak of a mandate according to Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter; and in the 
third case, NATO acted without the authorization of the UN Security Council. 
R2P is about the responsibility to act. The primary responsibility lies with the state itself. If a state is 
unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from mass atrocities, the responsibility falls to the 
international community, first of all to the UN Security Council. If the Security Council fails to deal 
with the threat within a reasonable time, the responsibility to protect the people at risk may pass to 
the UN General Assembly or to regional or sub-regional organizations. This responsibility may include 
coercive measures and in extreme cases military intervention. 
To prevent individual states from using the report as pretence for individual action, it refrains from 
mentioning “humanitarian intervention” specifically, but uses similar terminology: “military 
intervention” for “humanitarian protection purposes.” The real question, however, is what are the 
principles for military intervention. Under what conditions, when, and how should force be used? 
R2P calls for moving away from the right of the interveners toward the right of victims and the 
responsibility of states and the international community to protect people. 
                                                 
1
 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: “The Responsibility To 
Protect”, December 2001. 
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Just war 
R2P uses the criteria of the just war theory, which has been debated by peace researchers for 
decades. According to R2P:  
 There has to be a just cause for military intervention for human protection purposes. To be 
warranted, there must be a “large scale loss of life,” regardless of whether there is genocidal 
intent or not, or a “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing.’” The question remains open about who 
defines what is “just” and what is “large scale.” 
 There also must be a right intention, which means that the primary purpose of the 
intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering, regardless of whatever other motives 
intervening states may have (e.g., to prevent huge refugee flows; geopolitical interests). 
 Military intervention must be the last resort and can only be justified when every non-
military option has been explored. This criterion would be consistent with the UN Charter, 
according to which the non-military measures provided for in Article 41 must be proven 
inadequate before actions involving the use of force according Article 42 can be taken.2 
Critics from the armed forces and NGOs both argue that action should be taken as early as 
possible to be successful. For example, this argument was used repeatedly by General 
Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe,3 during the air campaign in Kosovo 1999. 
When civilians were killed during the rallies in Syria in early summer 2011, some NGOs 
requested an early intervention. 
 Concerning the scale, duration, and intensity of the planned military intervention, the means 
must be proportional, using only the minimum necessary force. 
 There must be reasonable prospects of success in halting or averting the suffering. At a 
certain point doubts may arise about whether the number of lives lost is not higher than 
those saved. In summer 2011, the air campaign in Libya seems to have reached a tipping 
point. We know that there were similar uncertainties during the air campaign in Kosovo in 
1999. 
                                                 
2
 M. Roscini, “The United Nations Security Council and the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law,” in 
Israel Law Review, Vol. 43, 330-359 (2011). 
3
 W. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (2002). 
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 The critical criterion turns out to be the right authority. Who decides what is a “conscience-
shocking situation,” what is “just,” what is “right,” “proportional,” when is the “last resort” 
and what is a “reasonable prospect”? 
 
Competent authority 
The R2P criteria themselves are somewhat ambiguous and leave room for interpretation. Therefore, 
there is a hidden tension over what is more important: the criteria or the competent and enduring 
authority. The main challenge is how to reconcile these two approaches.  
The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan4 made several attempts to do this. His reports 
defined guiding principles on whether and when to authorize, endorse and mandate the use of force. 
They identified a set of guidelines and criteria for legitimacy that the competent authority (i.e., the 
Security Council) should always address in considering whether to authorize or apply military force. 
The adoption of these guidelines (seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional 
means and balance of consequences) should not produce agreed conclusions but “improve the 
chances of reaching international consensus.” The reports argue that in exercising the responsibility 
to protect, “Chapter VII fully empowers the Security Council to deal with every kind of threat that 
States may confront. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of 
authority but to make it work better than it has.” 
R2P does not endorse unilateral action but leaves open the possibility that action does not have to 
be entirely dependent on Security Council authorization. If the Security Council “fails to discharge its 
responsibility to protect in “conscience-shocking situations” crying out for action, concerned states 
may not rule out other means ….” However, in such a case the United Nations may suffer, the report 
warns. What would be the alternative to the Security Council—the United States, Russia, the 
European Union, the African Union, the Organization of American States, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Collective Security Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
or….? Allowing any one state or organization to act alone is allowing all! R2P is not the “right to 
intervene” of any state, but the “responsibility to protect of every state.” The United Nations 
(preferably the Security Council) turns out to be the competent enduring authority to allow the use 
of force without an adequate alternative. This is indispensable to avoid the pitfalls and loopholes of 
the R2P criteria. 
                                                 
4
 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, “A more secure world: our shared 
responsibility,” (2 December 2004). Report of the Secretary-General, “In larger freedom: towards development, 
security and human rights for all” (21 March 2005). 
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The R2P criteria might intend to make it more difficult for states to put a humanitarian label on self-
interested interventionism, but they also could be seen as opening the door to a general pattern of 
intervention. If there is no internationally recognized competent authority, any state could maintain 
the “right to intervene” for itself. To declare the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 as a R2P case would 
be a case in point since human rights violations by Saddam Hussein were a minor factor in the 
decision to use force. Even preventive wars could be justified; the R2P report explicitly allows 
“anticipatory measures.” The R2P criteria cannot stand alone without defining the “right authority.” 
Since the 2005 World Summit, several Security Council resolutions have made reference to the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. Resolution 1674 of 2006,5 for example, commits the Security Council to take action to 
protect civilians in armed conflict; so does Resolution 1894 of 2009. Resolution 1674 stresses that 
collective action should be taken through the Security Council,  in accordance with the UN Charter, 
including Chapter VII. Resolution 1706 of August 2006 authorizes the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers to Sudan. Resolution 1973 of March 20116 emphasizes the responsibility of the Libyan 
authorities to protect the Libyan population and of the parties to armed conflicts “to take all feasible 
steps to ensure the protection of civilians.” 
 
The Libyan case 
Before the states of the coalition of the willing decided to use force to protect Libyan civilians against 
armed attacks by the Libyan regime, they had to take into consideration several factors: 
1. What is the political goal? In the wake of the successful anti-regime movements in 
Tunisia und Egypt, most of the governments involved and other observers expected that 
it was only a matter of time before Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi would be removed 
from power. The political goal — explicit or not — was regime change! In itself regime 
change does not meet the R2P criterion of the right intention unless the just cause 
cannot be achieved otherwise. The purpose of the use of force could be other than 
humanitarian. Another objective has been to demonstrate solidarity within the NATO 
alliance, certainly not a R2P criterion, but it put pressure on alliance members to join the 
coalition. Germany has been criticized heavily for lacking alliance solidarity because it 
abstained from the Security Council vote — although its concerns about the military 
success of the campaign might have been legitimate (see point 3). 
                                                 
5
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674, adopted on 28 April 2006. 
6
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March 2011. 
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2. In the framework of the concept of human security, the just cause would be met if the 
primary purpose of the intervention were the protection of civilians from grave and 
systematic violations of human rights. For the U.S. State Department, humanitarian 
reasons were the decisive factor, not potential military hazards, and it overruled the 
Pentagon, which had doubts about the military feasibility (see point 3). 
3. The decision for a military intervention was characterized by the somewhat contradictory 
criteria of last resort and proportionality. On the one hand, there was agreement among 
the major states that the Libyan opposition forces had to be supported by military 
means. For several reasons the deployment of “occupation forces” on the ground was 
seen as disproportionate, on the other hand. Some (e.g., the Pentagon, Germany) 
warned that a ban on flights and an air campaign would not be sufficient and would lead 
to “mission creep” requiring more and heavier military means. In the past, no-fly-zones 
and air campaigns have proven insufficient. The no-fly-zone in Iraq was already in place 
when Saddam Hussein liquidated tens of thousands of Shiites during the uprisings in 
1991; the killings in Srebrenica happened when flights by the Yugoslav army had already 
been banned; during the NATO air campaign in Kosovo, ethnic cleansing actually 
increased. Yet in all these cases, military concerns, leaving aside the humanitarian 
aspects, have been valid. 
4. Security Council Resolution 1973 met the criteria of the right authority. This resolution 
authorizes the participating states “to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.” The resolution definitely was 
consistent with the other R2P criteria such as the just cause threshold and the right 
intention. At the beginning of the operation it contradicted the political goal of removing 
Gaddafi from power, however (unless Gaddafi euphemistically is defined as a militarily 
relevant target). During the protracted air campaign the question arose whether R2P can 
be successfully implemented without regime change. In this case, regime change became 
a right intention (see point 1). 
5. Geopolitical considerations can be ignored. Libya is a small country with six million 
inhabitants and in contrast to Egypt, it has no geopolitical significance. Libya’s two 
percent of global oil reserves could easily be replaced by other sources; after all, Gaddafi 
would have been eager to sell his oil. Had geopolitics or “vital interests” been a main 
purpose for the intervention, it would have been in sharp contrast to the R2P right 
intention. 
7 
 
6. The R2P report states that “right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, 
clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.” In contrast to the Iraq 
war, the Libyan operation is clearly multilateral. There is a Security Council mandate that 
is being implemented by a coalition of NATO states. In addition, the resolution has been 
endorsed by the Arab League. The United States in particular signaled that this time it 
renounced a unilateral approach. France tried to take the lead; if it had done so for the 
sake of leadership, it would not be a right intention, however. 
In sum, one could argue that the Libyan case could be seen as an R2P case, although Resolution 1973 
also refers to the UN Charter in that the situation in Libya constitutes “a threat to international peace 
and security.” There are tensions between some of the R2P criteria. The political goal of regime 
change and the limited mandate of the Security Council to protect civilians are not necessarily 
congruent. Also, the possibility of implementing humanitarian goals by military means remains 
questionable as the differences between the Pentagon and the State Department, and between 
France and Germany, demonstrate. 
 
Outlook 
R2P is an expression of change in the norms of state sovereignty. They have given way to the human 
rights revolution and new ideas about a more complex array of norms concerning legitimacy and 
authority. Opposition to Bush’s Iraq war was not about the use of force as such, but rather about the 
principles and procedures for using military power.7 If there were no legitimate international 
competent and enduring authority, liberals in both governments and NGOs might want to decide for 
themselves if and when human rights were violated, and neoconservative nationalists might want to 
determine whether and where to promote democracy (with or without the use of force). Instead, 
both camps feel constrained by multilateral institutions, and may even benefit from unipolar 
structures. There is no alternative to an international order based on rules, principles and 
institutions. 
 
Heinz Gärtner is professor at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs – oiip and lecturer at the 
University of Vienna. He is editor of the book “Obama and the Bomb: The Vision of a World Free of 
Nuclear Weapons”, (Peter-Lang Publisher: Frankfurt am Main), April 2011. 
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 G. J. Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation oft he American World Order (2011), 
270-277. 
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